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Abstract
Secure networks rely upon players to maintain security and reliability. However not every
player can be assumed to have total loyalty and one must use methods to uncover traitors in
such networks. We use the original concept of the Byzantine Generals Problem by Lamport
[7], and the more formal Byzantine Agreement describe by Linial [9], to find traitors in secure
networks. By applying general fault-tolerance methods to develop a more formal design of
secure networks we are able to uncover traitors amongst a group of players. We also propose
methods to integrate this system with insecure channels. This new resiliency can be applied
to broadcast and peer-to-peer secure communication systems where agents may be traitors or
become unreliable due to faults.
Keywords: Secure Communication; Byzantine Agreement; Distributed Systems; Fault Tolerance;
Message Authentication;
1 Introduction
A reliable communications system must be able to cope with failure of one or more of its compo-
nents. Users within a communications network can also be classified as components of this system.
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A failed component may exhibit many different types of behaviour, which may include, sending
conflicting, spurious or clearly false information. This sort of problem was expressed abstractly by
Lamport [7], as the Byzantine Generals Problem (BGP).
The best way to conceptualise the BGP is to use the example of an army poised for attack [7]. The
army is comprised of several divisions, each commanded by a general. Having sent out observers
the general must decide on a course of action. This must be a collective decision based on all the
available facts and played out by each division in unison. However in some cases there may be a
traitor.
While broadcasting guarantees the recipient of a message that everyone else has received the same
message. This guarantee may no longer exist in a setting in which communications are peer-to-
peer and some of the people within this network are traitors. In this type of setting a Byzantine
agreement offers a means to achieving the required form of broadcast.
Byzantine Agreements are used widely as a method for fault tolerance in distributed systems.
We have outlined the original literature of Lamport [7, 8] and Pease [13] so that we can explore the
area in greater depth. The use of a more formalised version of the BGP was investigated in section
3, using the developments of Pease and Lamport [13, 7]. Furthermore we also adapt a approximate
solution to the infinite message case of the Weak Byzantine Generals Problem of Lamport [8].
We go on to develop the use of Byzantine Agreements (BA), in a secure communication envi-
ronment. Linial [9], provides us with a wide ranging insight into how BA’s can be used to establish
protocols for secure communication. We also define current cryptographic methods in terms of a
BA and examine how these methods compare to information theoretic protocols.
We move on to using BA’s in an insecure environment, where communication channels can be-
come faulty. Dasgupta’s [4], work on agreement using faulty interfaces, develops an analogy very
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close to that of channels which may become unreliable.
2 BA in Secure Communication
The Byzantine Agreement problem is one of a collection of more general problems in Fault-tolerance.
In this section we apply the work of [9, 2, 6], in an attempt to further our case for applying Byzantine
Agreements to secure communication and fault detection.
2.1 Traitor-tolerance under secure communication
Before we begin we need to make two assumptions about the behaviour of traitors. There are two
types of bad player in this model, curious or malicious.
• Curious players try to extract as much information from the fringes of operation as possible
from exchanges from good players and themselves. This raises the problem of information
leaks, and trying to prevent curious players from taking advantage of this source information.
• Malicious act in a manner which can directly undermine the integrity of a network.
There are two models for how good players hide information:
• Information-theoretic: Secure communication channels exist between every two agents. No
third party can gain any information by eavesdropping messages sent on any such channel.
A good example of this sort of protection against a man in the middle attack such as this, is
the use of quantum cryptography over fibre optic cables.
• Bounded Computational Resources/Cryptographic set-up: It is assumed in these
models that the participants have restricted computational power. For example:
– Secure message passing: This case is only of interest over Insecure channels and/or if
the bounds on computational power allow the simulation of a secure communication
channel.
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– The ”and” function: Two players have a single input bit each, and they need to compute
the logical ”and” of these two bits. Secure channels do not help in this problem, but
this task can be performed in the cryptographic set-up.
– The millionaires’ problem: There is a protocol which allows players P1 and P2 to find
out which of the integers x1, x2 is bigger, without P1 finding out any other information
about x2 and vice versa? This is only interesting if there is a commonly known upper
bound on both x1, x2.
– Game playing without a Grand Designer: Barany and Fu¨redi [1] show how n ≥ 4 players
may safely play any noncooperative game in the absence of a grand designer, even if one
of the players is trying to cheat. As Linial outlines in [9], this result can be strengthened,
so that this condition will hold even if as many as ⌊ (n−1)3 ⌋ players deviate from the rules
of the game.
– Secure Voting: Consider n voters, each of whom casts one yes/no vote on an issue. At
the end of the voting round we may ask that the tally be made known to all players.
This observation should be taken into account in making the formal definition of ”no
information leaks are allowed”.
Based on Linial’s work [9], we investigate the two main models for bad players’ behaviour.
Model 1: Curious Players
• Store all messages seen throughout the duration of the protocol.
• Traitors collaborate to extract as much information as possible from their records of a run.
• The behaviour of players who are said to be curious.
• We must impose a No Information Leak clause on this model, so that no information other
than that collected by the traitors as a group is stored to undermine the network.
Model 2: Malicious Players A more demanding model assumes that nothing with regard to
the behaviour of the traitors as in the Byzantine Agreement problem. In this situation we are
4
more concerned with the correctness of the computation is in jeopardy. If we were to compute
f(x1, . . . , xn) and some player i refuses to reveal xi (which is known only to him), then any cal-
culation dependant on this is corruptible. Furthermore if player i intentionally sends an incorrect
value for xi, they would be doing so with the desire of being undetected. If it were possible to relax
the requirement for no information leak, then correctness can in principle be achieved through the
following commitment mechanism:
• If each player places their value for xi in an envelope then all envelopes are publicly opened
and referred to be locally threaded.
• We can evaluate |f(x1, . . . , xn)| − f(xi, x˜i)| < ε so that if xi is not valid we can draw from
the set z1, . . . , zn for a valid response.
Thus we can perform these tasks without using physical envelopes. Given appropriate means for
concealing information, as well as an upper bound on the number of faults, it is possible to compute
both correctly and without leaking any information.
The type of protocols that may be applied can be classed as follows:
• A specification of the task which is to be performed.
• An upper bound m for the number of unreliable players out of a total of n
• The assumed nature of the traitors; curious or malicious
• The countermeasures available: Either secure communication lines or a bound on the disloyal
players’ computational power.
The main result of this section, is that if the number m < ∞ of traitors is properly bounded, so
that both modes of deceit (curious and malicious) with two guarantees of safety (secure lines and
restricted computational power) enable for correct and leak free computation. We must now state
how these results applies to our problem from Linial [9] :
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(1): Given f : f1, . . . , fn, in n variables and players P1, . . . , Pn which communicate via secure
channels then each player Pi, holds an input xi known only to them. There exists a protocol
which is leak free against any proper minority of curious players. Given a coalition of players
S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with |S| ≤ ⌊ (n−1)2 ⌋, where every communique is computationaly based on the set of
messages passed to any Pj(j ∈ S) can also be computed given only the xj and fj(x1, . . . , xn) for
j ∈ S.
The computation of f(x1, . . . , xn) is not guaranteed to force traitors to supply their correct in-
put values. The best that can be hoped for is that traitors can be made to commit on input values,
which are independent of the input reliable players. After such a commitment stage, the computa-
tion of f proceeds correctly and without leaking information. In any case a traitors refusal to supply
an input, will result in the default value. That is, the protocol computes a value f(y1, . . . , yn) so
that yi = xi for all i /∈ S and where the yj(j ∈ S) are chosen independently of xi(i /∈ S).
The same results hold if the functions fj are replaced by probability distributions and instead
of computing the functions we need to sample according to these distributions. We should also
restate that the bounds on this theorem are indeed tight.
(2): Assume that one-way trapdoor permutations exist, p1356 [9]. If we modify the situation
in (1) as follows we can use the following:
Channels are not secure, but agents are probabilistic, polynomial-time Turing Machines. Similar
conclusions hold with the bound ⌊ (n−1)2 ⌋ and ⌊
(n−1)
3 ⌋, replaced by by n − 1 and ⌊
(n−1)
2 ⌋ respec-
tively. Again the bounds are tight and the results hold also for sampling distributions rather than
for evaluation of functions [9].
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2.2 Protocols for Secure Collective Communication
Given a set of n agents and an additional trusted party which may be referred to as a grand de-
signer [5], there are various goals that can be achieved in terms of correct, reliable and leak-free
communication. In fact, all they need to do is relay their input values to the party who can compute
any functions of these inputs and communicate to every player any data desired. In broad terms,
our mission is to provide a protocol for the n parties to achieve all the tasks in the absence of a
trusted party. The two most important instances of this general plane are:
Privacy: If we consider a protocol for computing f1, . . . , fn, where originally party i holds xi, the
value of the ith variable and where by the protocol’s end it is known that fi(x1, . . . , xn)(1 ≤ i ≤ n).
The protocol is t-private if every quantity which is computable from the information viewed
throughout the protocol’s run by any coalition of |S| players, is also computable from their own
inputs and outputs.
Fault tolerance: The protocol is t-resilient if for every coalition S of no more than t parties
such that |S| ≤ t and the protocol computes a value f(y1, . . . , yn) so that yi = xi for all i /∈ S and
so that yj(j ∈ S) are chosen independent on the value of xi(i /∈ S).
We shall now express the results which hold under the assumption that traitors are coeducationally
restricted.
Theorem 2.1. Every function of n variables can be computed by n agents which communicate via
secure channels in a ⌊ (n−1)2 ⌋-private way. Similarly, a protocol exists which is both ⌊
(n−1)
3 ⌋−private
and ⌊ (n−1)3 ⌋−resilient, where the computational bounds are tight.
The are four protocols to describe according to the model (cryptographic or information-theoretic),
where bad players are assumed curious or malicious. All four protocols follow one general pattern,
which is explained below. We review the solution for the case in reasonable detail and then indicate
how it is modified to deal with the other three solutions.
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Since circuits can simulate Turing Machines, the problem becomes more structured, when rather
than dealing with a general function f the discussion focuses on a circuit which computes it with-
out loss of generality. In Goldreich [6], the idea that players collectively follow the computation
carried out by the circuit moving from one gate to the next, but where each of the partial values
computed in the circuit, is encoded as a secret shared by the players. To implement this idea one
needs to be able to:
• Assign input values to the variables in a shared way.
• Perform the elementary field operations on values which are kept as shared secrets. The
outcome should again be kept as a shared secret.
• If, at the computation’s conclusion, each player P is to possess a certain value computed
throughout, then all shares of this secret are to be handed to him by all other players.
In Linial [9], the 2nd item is investigated at greater depth, and we shall now follow his reasoning.
If we reconsider the information-theoretic, curious player scenario, we need to carry out our inves-
tigation in the following manner. Secrets are shared using a digital signature, and we need to be
able to add and multiply field elements which are kept as secrets shared by all players.
Schamir [16], goes on to describe the importance of dealing with the degree being too high, which
thus needs to be reduced. This is achieved by truncating high-order terms in g (g is the secret).
Letting h be the polynomial obtained by deleting all terms in g of degree exceeding m (m is the
number of players). If a (and respectively b) is the vector whose ith coordinate is g(αi) [respec-
tively h(αi)] the there is a matrix C depending only on the αi such that b = aC. Thus a degree
reduction, may be performed in a shared way, as follows. Each Pj knows g(αj) and for every i
we need to compute h(αi) =
∑
j ci,jg(αj) and inform Pi. Now, Pj computes ci,jg(αj) and deals it
as a shared secret among all players. Everyone then sums his shares for ci,jg(αj) over all j, thus
obtaining his share of h(αi) =
∑
ci,jg(αj), which becomes a shared secret. We should recall from
both Schamir and Linial [16, 9], that if sv are secrets, and s
µ
v is the share of sv held by player Pµ
then his share of
∑
sv, is
∑
sµv . So each player passes to Pi the share of h(αi), so now Pi can
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reconstruct the actual h(αi). Now free term of g which is the same as the free term of h, is kept as
a shared secret, as needed.
This establishes the ⌊ (n−1)2 ⌋−privacy part of the previous theorem. The condition that n > 2m is
implicit, [9]. Linial [9] also states that the more curious players cannot be tolerated by any protocol
follows from Chor’s result that it is impossible to compute the logical ”or” function for two players
[3]. Having dealt with curious players, we shall simply refer the reader to Linial’s treatment of
malicious players, (Linial [9]).
However we must state two important results from Linial which are directly related to our secure
communication theme for this paper. Besides the corruption of shares, there is also a possibility
that bad players who are supposed to share information with others will fail to do so. This difficulty
is countered by using a verifiable secret sharing scheme [11, 16].
Secondly the malicious case states that only n ≥ 3m + 1 can be dealt with in this way. This
follows the Byzantine Agreement protocol from section 3. So if players are not restricted to com-
municate via a secure two-party line, but can also broadcast messages, fact can increase resiliency
from ⌊ (n−1)3 ⌋ to ⌊
(n−1)
2 ⌋, [9].
3 BA and Insecure Communication Channels
Insecure communications channels also provide challenges when trying to achieve agreement amongst
a group of players. We shall use the modified version of the BGP to find agreement amongst a set
of players who are reliable but may encounter faulty interfaces [4]. This is analogous to a faulty or
insecure communication channels. In this section we will assume that a faulty channel can not be
relied upon as being secure. We consider three types of faults, namely message corruption, message
loss, and spurious message generation. A spurious message in our set of circumstances would be
regarded as a traitor generating some alternate set of messages to distribute across the network.
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We shall use Dasgupta’s [4], variant of the Byzantine generals problem, where agents who rep-
resent traitors are fully operation. However the disloyal agents interfaces with the communication
network may be faulty, causing them to send erroneous messages throughout the network. This
model can be briefly described by the following:
• Each agent has one or more communication devices available.
• In order to send a message, the source agent passes the message to the appropriate commu-
nications device.
• A channel receives a message from the first agent and delivers it to the second agent.
• One or more devices may be faulty.
• The agents themselves are reliable. However an agent with one or more faulty devices is called
the traitor.
We will use the conventions as outlined in Dasgupta [4] and categorize the types of faults that are
possible in this model as follows:
• m/m′ fault: The device receives a message m and communicates a different message m′ to
the other agent.
• m/θ fault: The device receives a message m and loses the message.
• θ/m′ fault: The device generates a spurious message m and loses it.
These protocols are used to analyze the Byzantine Agreement in the presence of faults. Throughout
this report we will make the assumption that is used in Dasgupta [4] and in the were all inter-agent
communication is synchronous.
So if we assume that all three types of faults are possible, then the agreement problem reduces
to the Byzantine Generals Problem such that more than two thirds of the participants are required
to be loyal. We should also note that if only m/m′ faults are possible, then the agreement problem
10
becomes trivial. In Dasgupta [4], a protocol which achieves agreement in one round is presented.
Furthermore Dasgupta [4] also shows that spurious messages causes the main difficulty in reaching
some sort of agreement. If m/m′ and m/φ are the only possible faults, then Dasgupta [4], asserts
that agreement is possible irrespective of the number of traitors within the network. Using the
protocol outlined in Dasgupta [4] we can use the proof of n < 3m+ 1 to argue that these types of
faults do not require interactive consistency.
3.1 Agreement Under Faults
3.1.1 Agreement under m/m′, m/φ and φ/m faults
In Dasgupta [4] it can be seen that if m/m′, m/φ and φ/m faults are all possible then the agreement
is logically equivalent to the BGP. We will now follow the work of Dasgupta [4] and examine the ways
in which an agent may fault in the original BGP and demonstrate possible equivalent situations in
this model:
1. A traitor receives a message and communicates some other message. This is equivalent to the
m/m′ fault.
2. A traitor receives a message and transmits nothing. (m/φ fault)
3. A traitor receives no message and transmits a spurious one. (φ/m′ fault)
Having observed that it is easy to see how agreements under m/m′, m/φ and φ/m faults is as
difficult as the original BGP. We should also note that the reverse is easier to see as the original
model asserts that the agent could be faulty. We shall now conclude this aspect of Dasgupta [4]’s
work by proposing a short theorem with an easy proof.
Theorem 3.1. If m/m′, m/φ and φ/m faults are all possible, then agreement is possible in m+1
rounds amongst at least 3m+ 1 agents.
Proof: Follows from the equivalence with the original Byzantine agreement problem. Agree-
ment can be reached in m+ 1 rounds using the unforgeable (oral) message protocol of Lamport in
[7].
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3.2 The Importance of m/φ and φ/m′ faults
Protocol for m/m’-only model
1. The General decides whether to attack or retreat
If the decision is to retreat the general remains silent
If the decision is to attack, the general sends a message to all lieutenant
2. If a member of the network (other than the general) receives any message in the first round
it decides to attack, otherwise it decides to retreat
Theorem 3.2. The protocol for the m/m’ only model achieves agreement in one round.
Proof: We shall outline a slightly different approach to that in Dasgupta [4], and separate the two
cases in a more formal way.
I. Suppose the commanding general decides to retreat. Since the general and his Lieutenant are
correct, the general does not attempt to send any message. Since φ/m′ problems are ruled
out, none of the other members receive any message from the general and therefore all of the
lieutenant retreat.
II. Now if we assume that the general decides to attack, then the entire network is correct. The
general attempts to send a message to every other member of his forces. Since m/φ faults are
ruled out, each of the Lieutenant receive some message (which may or may not be complete)
from the general, and decide to attack.
This result shows that if the Lieutenant’s are themselves correct, then the main difficulty in
achieving agreement is in the presence of m/φ and φ/m′ faults. We must also observe that the
absence of φ/m′ and m/φ faults, the generals with faulty interfaces also reach the same consensus.
3.3 Agreement under m/m′ and m/φ faults
In this section we consider a communication system/scenario which does allow φ/m. We will con-
sider this case out of special interest. Quite often network interfaces become faulty only if sensitized
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when an attempt is made to send messages through them. we present the algorithm as outlined
in [4], which achieves agreement in at most n + 1 rounds where n is the number of generals with
faulty interfaces.
In this protocol the decision to retreat is modelled by silence and attack is communicated by
sending a single message to each participant. The protocol among n generals is recursively de-
scribed by the following.
Algorithm M(0, n).
1. The Commanding General, communicates a message to every other general if it has decided
to attack. Otherwise it remains silent.
2. Each of the generals, Gi, acts as follows. If Gi has already decided, then it ignores all
messages. If Gi has not yet decided, then it decides to attack if it receives any message from
the commander, and decides to retreat otherwise.
Algorithm M(k, n), k > 0
1. The commanding General communicates a message to every other general if it has decided
to attack. Otherwise he remains quite.
2. Each of the other generals, Gi, act as follows.
• If Gi has already decided, then it will ignore all messages.
• If Gi has not yet decided, then it decides to attack if it receives any message from the
commanding general, and remains undecided otherwise.
• General Gi now acts as the commander in algorithm M(k − 1, n − 1) among the other
n− 2 generals.
As we have seen in both Lamport’s algorithm [7] and in Dasgupta [4], the protocol starts when
the general takes a decision on whether to attack or retreat, and initiates the protocol acting as
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the commander in algorithm M(k, n). The following results establish that in the presence of m/m′
and m/φ faults only, Algorithm M(k, n) achieves Byzantine Agreement in a cluster of n agents,
among these only k agents may have faulty interfaces. Thus Byzantine agreement is possible in
this model irrespective of the number of agents that have a faulty interface.
Lemma 3.3. If the instigator of the M(k, n) algorithm decides to retreat, than all other processors
agree to retreat.
Proof: If the instigator decides to retest, then he sends no message in M(k, n). Since φ/m′ faults
are ruled out, as none of the agents receive any message, and therefore send none in return. Thus
in round k + 1, when M(0, n − k) is initiated, so that all agents, including those with a faulty
interface decide to retreat.
In this proposed algorithm of Dasgupta [4], all agents but for the instigator, an agent sends out
messages only if it receives a message in the previous round. Thus except for the messages sent
out by the instigator, each message sent out by an agent is preceded (Causally) by the a receipt of
a message by that agent.
Definition 3.4. If an agent sends out a message m′ upon receiving a message m, then m′ is
referred to as being casually preceded by m. This relation is denoted m ≺ m′. Furthermore we can
say that the casual precedence is transitive. Messages which causally precede a message m as being
ancestors of m. We refer to the set of agents constituting the sender of m and the sender of all its
ancestors as the sender-set of m.
Lemma 3.5. If the first agent with all reliable interfaces reaches a decision to attack, then the
decision is made in round j, where j ≤ k, then by the end of round j + 1, all agents with reliable
interfaces agree to attack.
Proof: When an agent with reliable interfaces receives a message m, it decides to attack, and in
the following round it communicates messages to all the other agents which is not a member of the
sender-set of m. If P is the first agent with reliable interfaces to receive a message m (and decides
to attack). Thus none of the agents in the sender-set of m have all reliable interfaces. Therefore,
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in the next round P sends messages to all agents with reliable interfaces, and each agent decides
individually to attack.
Lemma 3.6. If no agent with reliable interfaces reaches a decision to attack by round k, then each
agent with reliable interfaces will decide to retreat in round k + 1.
Proof: Dasgupta [4] shows that if none of the agents will all reliable interfaces receive a message,
and decide to attack by round k. Then none of the agents receive a message in round k+1, therefore
all of them decide to retreat. The sender set of a message received in round k+1, has k+1 agents,
at least one of which must have reliable interfaces. That agent must receive a message by round k.
However this is a contradiction, since we have been given the information that the agents with all
reliable interfaces have received a message by round k.
Theorem 3.7. If m/m′ and m/φ are the only faults are possible, then it is possible to reach
Byzantine Agreement in a cluster of n agents of which at most k are faulty/disloyal, irrespective of
the ratio of k and n. Therefore Agreement can be reached in k + 1 rounds.
Proof: We will use Dasgupta’s proof, to show that the algorithm M(k, n) achieves this agreement.
If n − k ≤ 1, then the proof is self explanatory. Thus if we consider the other case where the
instigator decides to retreat. By Lemma 7.3, all agents agree to retreat in round k + 1. We shall
now consider now the cases when the instigator decides to attack. If we look at the two possible
cases, which depend on whether or not the interfaces of the instigator are all correct or not. We
shall follow Dasgupta [4], and treat each of these cases separately.
I. The Instigator is reliable. Thus if all interfaces of the instigator are reliable and the instigator
decides to attack, then it is successfully sends a message to all other agents in the first round.
II. The Instigator has faulty interfaces. If the instigator has one ore more faulty interfaces and
the instigator decides to attack, then it may succeed in sending messages to some and none
to others. In this case we need to follow Dasgupta [4] and prove that at the end of the
k + 1 round, agents with all reliable interfaces reach a common decision. Thus by Lemma
7.5, if an agent with all reliable interfaces receives a message by round j (j ≤ k), then by
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the end of round j + 1, agents with all reliable interfaces reach a common decision to attack.
However on the other hand, by Lemma 7.6, if no agent with all reliable interfaces receive
any message by round k, then agents with all reliable interfaces reach a common decision to
retreat. Therefore, even if the instigator has one or more faulty interfaces, agents with all
reliable interfaces reach a common decision.
4 Results and Conclusion
This investigation has lead us to the more formal design of secure communications networks which
are able to deal with both secure and insecure channels. Maintaining the resiliency of the secure
network is acheiveable given the use of a secret sharing scheme, the ability to broadcast as well as
using two-part secure lines. With our improvement to the treatment of m/φ and φ/m faults, the
security of a insecure communication channel can also be improved. Given the 3m + 1 condition
for insecure networks and the resilency improvement of secure channels to [(n− 1)/2] a new design
paradigm can be applied to networks of agents.
Much work needs to be done on refining methods for obtaining Byzantine Agreements [15, 10].
Further investigations into BA’s could concentrate on:
• The correlation between the median voter theorem, a social choice setting and BA’s.
• BA’s and their use in Cluster networks.
• BA’s for establishing communication protocols with peers that are not always available. (wan-
dering solider problem [10])
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